Since one of weak points of public crypto-systems is to require the verification of public key, identity based crypto-systems were proposed as an alternative. However, such techniques need a private key generator which can be a single point of failure. To improve such weakness, threshold identity-based crypto-systems were proposed. In this paper, we propose a new threshold identity-based encryption scheme which is constructed to extend an identity-based encryption scheme by Cocks. Since the proposed scheme is based on quadratic residues, it has smaller complexity of encryption. And we prove that the proposed scheme is secure against a chosen identity attack.
Introduction 1)
The main feature of an Identity-Based Encryption (IBE) scheme is usage of an unique identifier of a node (an arbitrary string, e.g. an email address) as the public key [1] . Current implementations of IBE schemes are based on different mathematical techniques: [2] , [3] use residues, [4] , [5] and [6] use elliptic curves.
As opposite to the traditional public key crypto-systems, a sender node in IBE scheme does not need to obtain the public key and certificate of an receiver node from a trusted entity. The sender could generate an appropriate public key by himself from the †비 회 원: State University of Airspace Instrumentation(SUAI) 교수 † †종신회원: 수원대학교 정보보호학과 전임강사 논문접수: 2012년 3월 20일 수 정 일: 1차 2012년 5월 22일 심사완료: 2012년 6월 11일 * Corresponding Author : Kim DaeYoub(daeyoub69@suwon.ac.kr) publicly known identifier of the receiver node. Therefore, IBE scheme does not require a trusted certification authority in order to store/manage public keys and certificates for all nodes.
However, IBE scheme should requires an another trusted entity called as private key generator (PKG) which on demand generates private keys for nodes from their identifiers using a master secret key. PKG can be a single point of failure in IBE scheme. For example, if PKG is compromised, all earlier issued keys will be also compromised. And when PKG is unavailable, a new node could not join a domain/network, because the new node could not obtain its private key elsewhere.
To eliminate the aforementioned disadvantage of IBE scheme, a threshold identity-based encryption (TIBE) scheme was proposed. In TIBE scheme, each predefined size coalition of nodes could act as PKG. That is, assume that there are  nodes in a domain/network that can participate in an private key generation process. Then each coalition containing  ( ≤ ) such nodes could together perform PKG operations. The coalition could generate private keys for the new nodes, but none of the coalition members has complete information about the master secret key as well as about the generated private keys of the new nodes.
The main idea of TIBE is to distribute a master secret key between all  nodes using a secret sharing scheme. In general, a threshold key generation works as follows: A new node chooses coalition of  nodes and then sends them a request. Each coalition node individually makes a partial calculation using both its own share of the master secret key and the identifier of the new node, and then sends back the result (a private key share) to the new node. The new node combines all received shares for obtaining its own private key.
There were proposed several TIBE schemes ( [7] , [8] ) based on the technique of the elliptic curves for IBE schemes of the same type ( [4] , [6] ). For enhancing the performance of TIBE scheme, we propose a new TIBE scheme based on Cock's IBE scheme proposed in [2] which is based on the technique of the quadratic residues having smaller complexity of encryption then elliptic curve based scheme. This work is important because this is the first attempt to apply threshold scheme to a residual based IBE.
The paper is organized as follows: The following section briefly gives the definition of TIBE. Section 3 explains assumptions that will be used in a security proof. In Section 4, we propose a new TIBE and describe both the construction of the TIBE and its security analysis. The paper ends with some concluding remarks. 6. ValidateCT    : It takes as input the public scheme parameters  , an identifier  and a ciphertext . It outputs "valid" or "invalid". If "valid",  is regarded as a valid result of Encrypt process under  .
7. Decrypt       : It takes as input the public scheme parameters  , an identity  , a private key   and a ciphertext . It outputs a message  or a failure symbol ⊥ .
In these functions, ShareVerify and ValidateCT are not presented in our scheme: Since ShareVerfiry could be realized using the known techniques from [9] , ShareVerify is not presented. Accordingly, Setup does not calculate the verification key  and ShareKeyGen does not output the share verification key   ; Because ValidateCT is required for a security proof in a chosen ciphertext attack model and the base of our TIBE (Cocks' scheme) is only secure in a chosen plaintext attack model [2] , ValidateCT is not described.
TIBE security notion
In this section, we describe the security notion for TIBE scheme based on [7] . As mentioned in [7] , the security of TIBE is defined by both a consistency of key generation and a security against chosen identity attack. In the chosen identity attack, an attacker tries to generate the private key for a node with  . There are two models of the chosen identity attack: the first one is an adaptive-ID attack, when an adversary chooses a target identity adaptively; the second one is a selective-ID attack, when an adversary selects it in advance.
Consistency of key generation in our scheme follows from Shamir's secret sharing properties and expressions (9)-(11), so it seems obvious and is not considered in details. The proof of the consistency of key generation is not considered in our work, because ValidateCT is not provided in our scheme for the reasons described above.
The proposed scheme will be shown to be secure against the adaptive-ID attack in the Random Oracle Model. In our case, the security against the adaptive-ID attack is defined using the following game:
1. I ni t : The adversary outputs a set of    PKG nodes  ⊂  ⋯  that it wishes to corrupt.
2. 
As result, either 
The ciphertext is a pair        . 4 . D e cr yp t : The receiver decrypt         using the secret key     as follows: [9] , to overcome this obstacle, following two restrictions were added:
1.  and  are "safe" primes, i.e.   ′   and   ′  , where ′ and ′ are also primes; 2. gcd′   gcd′   . Fortunately, both these requirements conform with Cocks' scheme. So we also use ideas from [9] to securely share a master secret key in our TIBE as follows:
1. Since gcd    , using the public parameter   and the extended Euclidean algorithm, the values of  and  satisfying        could be always found. Using these  and , it calculates:
4. E ncr yp t : To encrypt a message bit ∈  for a receiver with the identifier  , a sender calculates the receiver's public key       , generates two random values,   and   , holding
Then the sender finally calculates
The ciphertext is a pair        . 5. D e cr yp t : A receiver decrypt         using the secret key     as follows:
By definition from [7] , adaptive-ID attack is stronger then selective-ID attack. So if the proposed scheme is shown as adaptive-ID secure, it is the more secure to selective-ID attack. To prove the semantic security of the proposed TIBE against an adaptive-ID attack in the Random Oracle Model, we assume that the adversary A has the advantage          in attacking the proposed TIBE scheme for a given value of the security parameter . We now construct an algorithm B that attacks Cocks' IBE scheme with advantage  using A.
Assume that B has access to Cocks' encryption Oracle and knows only the public scheme parameter  . For using A, B should simulate all interactions between A and TIBE Oracle. It means that the simulators for functions Setup, Query phase 1 and Random Oracle (which simulates hash function  ) should be developed for B. These simulators and resulting game are as follows:
1. I ni ti al i z ati on : A chooses a set  of    PKG nodes that it wants to corrupt. Without lost of generality, let     ⋯   ⊂  ⋯ .
2. Se tup si mul ator : B randomly generates an odd integer   ∈  and gives the public scheme parameters       to A. For each of corrupted    nodes, the share is generated randomly in following interval           ∈⋯⌊⌋ . As in Shoup's scheme [9] 
It is possible to show that the valid private key share is obtained as the result.
5. C hal l e ng e : A outputs two messages,   and   , of equal length and an identifier  , on which it wishes to be challenged. B forwards these values to the Cocks' scheme challenger, receives a ciphertext and returns it to A. 6. Q ue r y p hase 2 : A issues an additional queries as in Query phase1 and B replies to them as earlier.
7. Gue ss : Finally, A outputs a guess bit ′∈. B forwards this bit to the Cocks' scheme challenger to finish its own game.
If B has generated valid   during Setup simulator step, then from the A point of view, his interactions with B are statistically indistinguishable from his interactions with a real TIBE challenger. The probability of generating the valid   is calculated as 
We could conclude that the proposed TIBE scheme is as secure as its base, i.e. Cocks' IBE scheme.
Conclusion
We proposed TIBE scheme based on the Cocks' IBE scheme. Our scheme is non-interactive and is the first TIBE scheme proposed for a residual based IBE scheme. From security point of view, it is proven to be secure against an adaptive-ID attack in the Random Oracle Model.
